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coupled with the resolution of the instant case, does result in a greater
range of conduct exposing an attorney to potential liability, but is consistent with an expressed intent to protect the investing public. 86
It must be emphasized that the instant case was remanded for an
evidentiary hearing, an injunction to be granted if negligence is found.
The resolution of the conflicting affidavits presented in this case87 should
set for the future the parameters for culpable conduct by attorneys in similar situations. Even were the facts to be resolved in Schiffman's favor, the
SEC requirement that an attorney reasonably investigate 8 clearly has not
been satisfied here. Responsible counsel should not take affirmative action
solely in reliance upon the letters of another attorney, if, because of insufficient knowledge of the underlying facts, he is hesitant to rely upon a
client's representation. The established practice of responsible counsel
should be to use due diligence to resolve for himself any factual as well
as legal matters that may be in question. The action taken by the Second
Circuit in the instant case fits well with prevailing practice and, as a preface
to the NSMC litigation, was a necessary step in holding the legal profession
to the degree of responsibility long requested and now required.
Marina P. Bartley
SECURITIES REGULATION UNDER RULE lOb-5 ABANDONED

PURCHASER-SELLER REQUIREMENT

BY THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT, STANDING TO SUE GRANTED TO A NoN-PURCHASING OR SELLING PLAINTIFF.

Eason v. General Motors Acceptance Corp. (7th Cir. 1973)
Bank Service Corporation (Bank Service) purchased an automobile
leasing business from Dave Waite Pontiac, Inc. (defendant seller).' As
consideration for the business, Bank Service issued stock to defendant
seller and assumed its liabilities, among which were certain notes payable
to defendant General Motors Acceptance Corporation (GMAC).2 The
notes were individually guaranteed by plaintiffs, shareholders in Bank
Service. 3 Due to alleged misrepresentation as to the value of the assets
to do so, he shall reveal the fraud to the affected person or
tribunal.
(2) A person other than his client has perpetrated a fraud upon a
tribunal shall promptly reveal the fraud to the tribunal.
Id. D.R. 7-102(B). Of course, a question would always exist as to how "clearly" the
fraud would have to be established before the duty would arise.
86. See notes 56-60 and accompanying text supra.
87. 489 F.2d at 538-39.
88. See note 31 supra.
1. Eason v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 490 F.2d 654, 655 (7th Cir. 1973),

cert. denied, 416 U.S. 960 (1974).

2. 490 F.2d at 655. GMAC financed the cars purchased by the leasing busi-

ness. by
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acquired by Bank Service, 4 the leasing business failed, causing Bank Service
to become insolvent and default on the notes.5 Defendant GMAC commenced suit in state court, seeking to hold plaintiffs liable on their individual guarantees.6 Plaintiffs countered with a suit in federal district court
seeking rescission of the guarantees, alleging violations of section 10-b
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,7 and Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) rule lOb-5s8 by both defendants. The district court
dismissed the complaint, holding that plaintiffs were neither purchasers
nor sellers of securities, and therefore, failed to meet the purchaser-seller
requirement 9 of Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., applicable in suits for
private relief under rule lOb-5.10 The United States Court of Appeals
4. Id. at 656. It is immaterial that the fraud involved related to the value of the
assets acquired rather than the value of the securities issued by Bank Service. The
rule only requires that the fraud be "in connection with" the sale of a security. See
note 7 infra. But see Fleischer, "Federal Corporation Law": An Assessment, 78

HARv. L. REV. 1146, 1161-62 (1965). The "in connection with" clause has been interpreted to require only that the fraud "touch" a securities transaction. Superintendent
of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12-13 (1971).
5. 490 F.2d at 656.
6. Id.
7. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970). The statute provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means, or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility
of any national securities exchange
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
registered on a national security exchange or any security not so registered, any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules
and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in
the public interest or for the protection of investors.

Id.
8. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1973).

The rule states that:

It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any
national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light
of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
9. 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952). In Birnbaum,
plaintiffs, minority shareholders, sued derivatively on behalf of the corporation and
as representatives of all other similarly situated shareholders, alleging that the president, the controlling shareholder of Newport, had abruptly broken off merger talks
with Follansbee Steel Corp. and instead sold his stock to Willport Company at a
substantial premium. Plaintiffs alleged fraud in violation of rule 10b-5 in that the
president misrepresented the reason for suspension of the merger talks in letters to
Newports' shareholders. 193 F.2d at 462. The Second Circuit upheld dismissal of
plaintiffs' claim holding that plaintiffs had neither purchased nor sold securities and
that rule lOb-5 extended protection only to the defrauded purchaser or seller. Id.
at 464.
10. 490 F.2d at 655. The district court opinion is unreported. The plaintiffs
advanced three arguments seeking to avoid the purchaser-seller limitation: (1) that
the guarantees were securities which they sold to GMAC; (2) that the notes payable
were securities which they were forced to purchase; and (3) that they were indirect
sellers of the shares issued by the corporation. Id. The court of appeals, in order to
reach the issue of the validity of the purchaser-seller requirement rejected the arguhttps://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol19/iss6/5
ments without discussion. Id. at 656.
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for the Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that Birnbaum was no longer
part of the law of the circuit, and that plaintiffs, as investors," had alleged
injury which could be redressed by a federal court under rule l0b-5.
Eason v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 490 F.2d 654 (7th Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 960 (1974).
Both the Securities Act of 1933 (1933 Act) 12 and the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act)' 3 were enacted in response to
the stock market collapse of 1929 and the resulting decline in investor
confidence. 14 Within the legislative scheme, Congress enacted section
10(b) of the Exchange Act, which forbids "any manipulative or deceptive
device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as
the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public
interest or for the protection of investors. 15 In 1942, in a seemingly
innocuous exercise of the rulemaking authority of this section, the SEC
announced the adoption of rule lOb-5,16 which essentially prohibited fraud
by any person in connection with the purchase or sale of securities. Four
years later, the rule acquired the basis for its immeasurable present import 1 7 when a federal district court held that there existed an implied
private right of action for violation of the rule.'8 However, the availability
11. For a discussion of the significance of this term, see text accompanying notes
41-45 infra.
12. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a et seq. (1970).
13. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a et seq. (1970). The Exchange Act also created the Securities and Exchange Commission. Id. § 78d (1970).
14. See generally 25 SEC ANN. REP. 215 (1959).
15. 15 U.S.C. § 78j (b) (1970). See note 7 supra.
16. SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 3230 (May 21, 1942). For the text
of the rule, see note 8 supra.
17. The Fifth Circuit recently remarked that "the rule has been applied in such
a variety of situations that one can scarcely find an issue of the advance sheets of
the Federal Supplement and Federal Reporter that does not contain an opinion on
§ 10(b)." Rekant v. Desser, 425 F.2d 872, 877 (5th Cir. 1970).
18. Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946). The
Supreme Court has now explicitly recognized the existence of an implied private right
of action for a violation of section 10(b). Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life &
Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971). In Kardon the court relied primarily upon the
statutory-tort theory in order to imply a private right of action. To explain the statutory-tort theory, the court cited RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 286 (1934), 69 F. Supp. at
513, which provides:
The violation of a legislative enactment by doing a prohibited act, or by failing to do a required act, makes the actor liable for an invasion of an interest of
another if :
(a) The intent of the enactment is exclusively or in part to protect an interest of the other as an individual; and,
(b) The interest invaded is one which the enactment is intended to protect; and,
(c) Where the enactment is intended to protect an interest from a particular
hazard, the invasion of the interest results from that hazard; and,
(d) The violation is a legal cause of the invasion, and the other has not so
conducted himself so as to disable himself from maintaining an action.
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 286 (1934). For a general discussion of the statutory-tort
theory, see 1 A. BROMBERG, SECURITIES LAW: FRAUD § 2.4(1) (a) (1973) [hereinafter
cited as BROMBERG].
A second theory upon which an implied right of action may be based, is that
of statutory voidability. This theory is based upon section 29(b) of the Exchange
Act, which provides that a contract in violation of the Exchange Act or any rule or
regulation promulgated thereunder shall be void. 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(b) (1970). The
10b-5 Repository,
thereby renders
rule Digital
that ifWidger
a violation
theory isCharles
of thisUniversity
rationale
Published
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School of
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1974 a contract
void, the injured party should have a remedy with respect to the void contract. The
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of the private remedy was later limited by the Second Circuit's pronouncement in Birnbaum that the rule's "umbrella" of protection extended only
to those who purchased or sold securities. 1 9 The life, death, and resurrection of the so-called Birnbaum doctrine has been one of the more con20
troversial issues in a rapidly expanding area of the law.
Eason marks the first time any circuit court of appeals has expressly
rejected 2 1 the purchaser-seller requirement in a suit for other than prospective injunctive relief. 22 The opinion is essentially a tripartite analysis
of plaintiffs' claims, the various parts of which merit separate consideration: First, did the plaintiffs have "standing" in its traditional sense?
Second, did the protection of rule lOb-5 extend to a party in the plaintiffs'
position? And third, were there overriding policy considerations which
should have defeated the plaintiffs' claim ?23
Although the term "standing" was not mentioned in the Birnbaum
decision, it is that label which courts often have attached to the purchaser-

court in Kardon listed this theory as an alternative basis for its decision. 69 F.
Supp. at 514.

Other theories upon which an implied right of action may be based include
those of statutory implication and statutory policy. See generally BROMBERG, supra,
at §§ 2.4(1) (b)-(d). It has also been argued that Congress did not in fact intend
section 10(b) to apply to private causes of action. See Ruder, Civil Liability Under
Rule 10b-5: Judicial Revision of Legislative Intent?, 57 Nw. U.L. REV. 627 (1963).

19. See note 9 supra.
20. The Birnbaum debate has produced an abundance of law review material.
See, e.g., Boone & McGowan, Standing to Sue Under SEC Rule 10b-5, 49 TEXAS L.
REV. 617 (1971) ; Kellogg, The Inability to Obtain Analytical Precision Where Standing to Sue Under Rule 10b-5 is Involved, 20 BUFFALO L. REV. 93 (1970) ; Lowenfels,
The Demise of the Birnbaum Doctrine: A New Era for Rule 10b-5, 54 VA. L. REV.
268 (1968); Comment, 10b-5 Standing Under Birnbaum: The Case of the Missing
Remedy, 24 HASTINGS L.J. 1007 (1973) ; Comment, The Decline of the PurchaserSeller Requirement of Rule 10b-5, 14 VILL. L. REV. 499 (1969).
21. Several courts and commentators have expressed the opinion that Birnbaum
has been implicitly overruled by some of the expansive readings of the terms "purchaser" and "seller." See e.g., Entel v. Allen, 270 F. Supp. 60, 69 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) ;
and Lowenfels, supra note 22. Subsequent decisions in the Second Circuit, however,
reaffirmed the vitality of Birnbaum. See, e.g., Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life
& Cas. Co., 430 F.2d 355, 360-61 (2d Cir. 1970), rev'd on other grounds, 404 U.S. 6
(1971) ; Iroquois Indus., Inc. v. Syracuse China Corp., 417 F.2d 963, 968-69 (2d Cir.
1969), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 909 (1970).
22. A number of courts have held that, in suits for prospective injunctive relief,
a plaintiff need not allege that he is a purchaser or seller of securities. Kahan v.
Rosenstiel, 424 F.2d 161, 170-73 (3rd Cir.) (dictum), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 950
(1970) ; Mutual Shares Corp. v. Genesco, 384 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1967). But see
Greater Iowa Corp. v. McLendon, 378 F.2d 783 (8th Cir. 1967) ; Jachimiec v.
Schenley Indus., Inc., Civil No. 51024 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 841 (1965).
The rationale of Genesco is that since one purpose of section 10(b) is to prevent the
use of manipulative devices, a party who may be subsequently injured by the device
or scheme is a "logical plaintiff" to aid the SEC in its enforcement of the Act. 384
F.2d at 547. Moreover, in a suit for injunctive relief the issues of proof of loss and
causation are avoided. Id. Presumably, a plaintiff who has purchased or sold securities in reliance upon some alleged fraudulent conduct or statement by defendant is
in a better position to prove the above elements, and for this reason it has been suggested that courts retain Birnbaum when dealing with completed transactions. Manor
Drug Stores v. Blue Chip Stamps, 492 F.2d 136, 141 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. granted,
95 S. Ct. 302 (1974). See also Kahan v. Rosenstiel, 424 F.2d 161, 173 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 398 U.S. 950 (1970) ; BROMBERG, supra note 18, § 4.7, at 565-66.
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol19/iss6/5
23. 490 F.2d at 656.
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seller requirement. Thus, where a complaint fails to allege that the plaintiff
was a purchaser or seller of securities, a motion to dismiss is frequently
granted because of "a lack of standing." 24 In the first segment of its
analysis, the Eason court noted two possible interpretations of the "standing" requirement: standing in a constitutional sense, as mandated by
article III, section 2, of the United States Constitution, 25 and standing
in a non-constitutional sense, dependent upon an analysis of plaintiffs'
2 6
status as persons protected by the rule or statute in question.
The doctrine of constitutional standing concerns whether a particular
plaintiff is an appropriate person to maintain the cause of action, 27 the
crucial question being whether "the dispute sought to be adjudicated will
be presented in an adversary context and in a form historically viewed as
capable of judicial resolution. ' 28 Presently the law of standing and the
29
precise tests to be applied in a particular situation are in a state of flux.

24. See, e.g., Manor Drug Stores v. Blue Chip Stamps, 492 F.2d 136, 141 (9th Cir.
1973), cert. granted, 95 S. Ct. 302 (1974).
25. 490 F.2d at 656. The federal judicial power is limited by article III of the
United States Constitution to "cases" and "controversies." U.S. CONST. art. III,
§ 2. The Constitution provides:
The Judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising
under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or
which shall be made, under their Authority; - to all Cases affecting Ambassadors,
other Public Ministers and Consuls; - to all Cases of Admiralty and maritime
Jurisdiction; - to Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party; to Controversies between two or more States; - between a State and Citizens
of another State; - between Citizens of different States; - between Citizens
of the same State claiming Lands under Grants of different States, and between
a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.
Id. (emphasis added).
According to the Supreme Court:
A case arises, within the meaning of the Constitution, when any question
respecting the Constitution, treatise or laws of the United States has assumed
'such a form that the judicial power is capable of acting on it." . . . A declaration
on rights as they stand must be sought, not on rights which may arise in the
future, and there must be an actual controversy over an issue, not a desire for
an abstract declaration of the law. The form of the proceeding is not significant.
It is the nature and effect which is controlling.
In re Summers, 325 U.S. 561, 566-67 (1945) (citations omitted).
In addition, the Court has noted:
[A] controversy must be definite and concrete, touching the legal relations
of parties having adverse legal interests. It must be a real and substantial controversy admitting of specific relief through a decree of a conclusive character,
as distinguished from an opinion advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts.
Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 240-41 (1937) (citations omitted).
The "case and controversy" requirement of Article III is satisfied by an
allegation that the plaintiff has suffered "injury in fact, economic or otherwise."
Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 151-52 (1970).
26. 490 F.2d at 657.
27. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99-100 (1968).
28. Id. at 101.
29. In a recent decision involving a challenge to an action of an administrative
agency, Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150,
152-54 (1970), the Supreme Court articulated a two-pronged test for standing. The
initial test mandated by Data Processing was that of determining whether plaintiff
has alleged an "injury in fact, economic or otherwise." Id. at 152. Next, it had to
be determined whether the interest sought to be protected is arguably within the
Published
Villanovato University
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Widger School
of Law
Digital
1974guarantee
zone of by
interests
be protected
or regulated
by the
statute
or Repository,
constitutional

5

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 19, Iss. 6 [1974], Art. 5
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 19

Nevertheless, the test for constitutional standing is generally formulated
as one which requires plaintiff to allege "injury in fact, economic or otherwise."30 The Eason court stated that the purchaser-seller requirement
was not constitutionally mandated 3 1 under this test since plaintiffs who
were neither purchasers nor sellers could nonetheless demonstrate the
requisite injury. In the instant case, for example, the plaintiffs were
potentially liable as guarantors of notes worth $300,000 as a result of the
transaction with defendants.
The court, therefore, turned to the second interpretation of the standing requirement - whether plaintiffs were among the class of persons
intended to be protected by the rule. Perhaps mindful of Mr. Justice
Douglas' admonition that "[g]eneralizations about standing to sue are
largely worthless as such," 32 the Eason court concluded that the issue
should not be phrased in terms of "standing,"33 and, with that as its predicate, initiated the discussion contained in the second part of its analysis.
Any resolution of the problem of who is protected by rule lOb-5
necessarily turns upon an interpretation of the legislative intent behind
the provision. In reaching its more restrictive interpretation, the Birnbaum
court chose to look to the SEC release accompanying rule lOb-5 3 4 as a
vehicle for determining legislative intent. Using the premise of the release - that rule lOb-5 was designed to close a "loophole" in section 17(a)
in question. Id. at 153. For a discussion of the foregoing, see Davis, The Liberalized
Law of Standing, 37 U. CHI. L. REv. 450 (1970); Jaffe, Standing Again, 84 HARv.
L. REv. 633 (1971).
The courts of appeals have split on the issue of whether the Data Processing
test is limited to suits involving administrative agency action - as in Data Processing - or extends also to suits between private parties. Compare American
Postal Workers Union v. Independent Postal System of America, Inc., 481 F.2d 90
(6th Cir. 1973), petition for cert. dismissed, 415 U.S. 901 (1974) (Data Processing
applicable only to challenges to governmental action) with National Ass'n of Letter
Carriers v. Independent Postal System of America, Inc., 470 F.2d 265 (10th
Cir. 1972) (Data Processing test applied in an action between private parties). In
the foregoing cases, the courts dealt with the questions of standing and implied right
of action under various postal statutes. See 19 VILL. L. REv. 507 (1974).
30. Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150,
167-68 (1970) (Brennan & White, JJ., concurring and dissenting) ; Landy v. FDIC,
486 F.2d 139, 158 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 960 (1974).
The Eason court cited Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923), as an
example where a plaintiff lacked standing in the constitutional sense. 490 F.2d at 657.
31. 490 F.2d at 657. The Ninth Circuit has stated that the purchaser-seller
limitation is required "as a matter of constitutional necessity." Mount Clemens Indus.,
Inc. v. Bell, 464 F.2d 339, 343 (9th Cir. 1972).
32. Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150,
151 (1970).
33. 490 F.2d at 657-58. At least two circuits have attempted to resolve the standing issue by an application of the two-pronged test of Data Processing. Landy v.
FDIC, 486 F.2d 139 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 960 (1974); Herpich v.
Wallace, 430 F.2d 792 (5th Cir. 1970). Both courts concluded that those who were
neither purchasers nor sellers were not within the statute's zone of protected interests. 486 F.2d at 158; 430 F.2d at 806. In light of the sweeping intent of Congress
in enacting the securities laws, the conclusion that all plaintiffs who have neither
purchased nor sold securities are not even arguably within the zone of protected
interests seems unwarranted. See text accompanying notes 57-58 infra.
34. SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 3230 (May 21, 1942), reproduced
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol19/iss6/5
in 3 BROMBERG, supra note 18, appendix B, at 295.
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of the 1933 Act"5 resulting from the fact that that section only prohibited
fraud upon buyers of securities3 6 -

the Birnbaum court concluded that

37
the rule extended protection only to purchasers and sellers of securities.
Conversely, the Eason court, relying upon the rule's expansive language,38
Supreme Court statements advocating a broad and flexible reading of
the rule,30 and the ongoing expansion of the Birnbaum test since its inception, 40 determined that the class of persons which the rule was intended to protect was broader than that comprised only of purchasers
and sellers of securities. 41 The court focused upon the literal breadth of
'42
the rule, with particular regard to the words "fraud upon any person.
It reasoned that to construe this language flexibly as urged by the Supreme

Court 43 required protection of a class of persons broader than that which

Birnbaum had permitted.4 4 Consequently, according to the instant court,
any plaintiff who could establish his status as an "investor" and who

35. 15 U.S.C. § 77(q)(a) (1970). Section 17(a) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of any securities by
the use of any means or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate commerce or by the use of the mails, directly or indirectly(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, or
(2) to obtain money or property by means of any untrue statement of a
material fact or any omission to state a material fact necessary in order to
make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they
were made, not misleading, or

(3) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which

operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser.
Id. (emphasis added).
36. See note 35 supra.
37. 193 F.2d at 464, citing SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 3230
(May 21, 1942).
38. For the text of the rule, see note 8 supra.
39. See Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 151 (1972) quoting
SEC v. Capital Gains Res. Bureau, 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963).
40. There have been several judicially created "exceptions" to the Birnbaun
rule. The term "exception" is actually a misnomer, since expansion has been from
within by classification of the plaintiff as a purchaser or seller rather than from
without by allowing a non-purchaser or non-seller to maintain the cause of action.
Nevertheless, the courts have created categories of plaintiffs who are deemed to be
purchasers or sellers for purposes of maintaining a cause of action under rule 10b-5,
although they would not be considered as such according to the traditional use of the
terms. See, e.g., Travis v. Anthes Imp. Ltd., 473 F.2d 515 (8th Cir. 1973) ("delayed
seller" - one who plans to sell at a certain point but delays because of defendant's
fraud, suffering a loss as a consequence); Vine v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 374 F.2d 627
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 970 (1967) ("forced seller" - one who, as a result
of defendant's fraud, is left with the alternative of retaining worthless securities or
selling at a depressed price) ; Commerce Rep. Co. v. Puretec, Inc., 290 F. Supp. 715
(S.D.N.Y. 1968) (the "aborted purchaser" - one who has entered into a contract
to buy securities which is frustrated because of defendant's fraud). Recent additions
to this list include those in Manor Drug Stores v. Blue Chip Stamps, 492 F.2d 136
(9th Cir. 1973), cert. granted, 95 S. Ct. 302 (1974) (plaintiffs, entitled to purchase
securities under antitrust consent decree, granted standing since consent decree is
functional equivalent of a contract to buy) ; and Heyman v. Heyman, 356 F. Supp. 958
(S.D.N.Y. 1973) (holders of beneficial interest in securities bought or sold granted
standing to sue although they neither purchased nor sold securities). For an excellent
summary of the various "exceptions," see Comment, supra note 20.
41. 490 F.2d at 659.
42. 490 F.2d at 659, quoting SEC rule 10b-5.
43. See note 38 and accompanying text supra.
44. 490
F.2d at 659.
Published
by Villanova
University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1974
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suffered injury as a direct consequence of fraud in connection with a
securities transaction 45 could invoke the protection of the rule. 40 The
plaintiffs, notwithstanding the fact that they had neither purchased nor
sold securities in the particular transaction, fulfilled this criterion by
reason of their statuses as shareholders and guarantors of the notes. They
47
could, therefore, sue in a federal court.

The Eason court's approach to this issue recognized that both the nonconstitutional interpretation of standing and the determination of the class
of persons to whom an implied right of action extends involve similar,
if not identical, considerations. 48 Each of these questions involves an
analysis of statutory language in an attempt to determine the class of
49
persons Congress intended to protect.
When dealing with an implied right of action, ° as in Eason and
Birnbaum, judicial interpretations of Congressional intent are readily
subject to varying and conflicting results.51 However, it is submitted that
Birnbaum's restrictive reading of rule lOb-5 and the subsequent narrow
construction of its holding are unwarranted in light of the statutory language5 2 and congressional intent. 53

Indeed, largely as a result of the

infinite varieties of fraud present in complex factual situations, 54 those

45. See note 4 supra.
46. 490 F.2d at 659.
47. Id. at 659-60.
48. See 3A H. BLOOMENTHAL, SECURITIES AND FEDERAL CORPORATE LAW § 11.09.
Cf. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341, 359 n.11 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 910 (1973). See also National R.R. Pass. Corp. v. National
Ass'n of R.R. Pass., 414 U.S. 453 (1974).
It may be argued that the court in Eason rejected the applicability of a nonconstitutional test for standing to the facts of the case and was stating that the only
question to be answered was whether plaintiffs were protected by rule 10b-5. Such an
argument, however, would mean that the Seventh Circuit sub silentio has denied the
applicability of the Supreme Court's decision in the Data Processing case to suits by
plaintiffs under rule lob-5. See note 28 supra.
49. National R.R. Pass. Corp. v. National Ass'n of R.R. Pass., 414 U.S. 453,
455-56 (1973).
50. See note 18 supra.
51. Compare Mount Clemens Indus., Inc. v. Bell, 464 F.2d 339, 341 (9th Cir.
1972), with Tully v. Mott Supermkts., Inc., 337 F. Supp. 834, 839 (D.N.J. 1972).
Both courts claimed to be construing lob-5 flexibly, and not technically or restrictively, as mandated by the Supreme Court in Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life
& Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12 (1971). However, the Mount Clemens court concluded
that such a construction compelled retention of Birnbaum while the Tully court condemned its retention. 464 F.2d at 341; 337 F. Supp. at 839.
52. See notes 7 & 8 supra.
53. See text accompanying notes 56-58 infra.
54. That fraudulent schemes can be very complex in nature is demonstrated by
the facts of Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971).
The scheme in Bankers Life resulted in the purchase of a corporation with its own
assets. Defendant purchasers paid for the stock of the corporation with a $5,000,000
check issued by a bank in which defendants had no funds deposited. This was accomplished by the intervention of a note brokerage firm. Once in control, defendants
deceived the board of directors into authorizing a sale of approximately $5,000,000 of
Treasury bonds held by the corporation. The proceeds of this sale were used to cover
the initial purchase of stock. Once again through the bank, defendants acquired a
$5,000,000 check and used it to purchase a certificate of deposit. They used this as
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol19/iss6/5
collateral for a $5,000,000 loan to cover the second check. The books of the corpora-
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courts which follow Birnbaum have been forced to construe the definitions
of "purchaser" and "seller" expansively to effectuate the purpose of the
rule. 55 On the other hand, a completely unrestricted application of the
rule seems equally undesirable, since it is unlikely that Congress intended
to provide a federal remedy for all injuries in any way connected with
50
a securities fraud.
Though a distillation of congressional intent from an analysis of the
legislative history of § 10(b) admittedly is inconclusive, 7 some general
objectives may be ascertained. Essentially, Congress was concerned with
the purity of the securities transaction and the securities trading process,
so as to allow investors a reasonable opportunity to make "knowing, intelligent decisions regarding their purchases and sales of securities in
unmanipulated markets."58 Arguably, therefore, Congress was concerned
not only with one who has been fraudulently induced to buy or sell securities, but also one who has been induced to take some other action which
does not culminate in or amount to a purchase or sale, yet ultimately
results in injury. This analysis dictates the rejection of either of the
polar views expressed above, and suggests that the rule should be applied
in a manner which is flexible enough as not to deny an appropriate plaintiff access to a federal forum, yet restrictive enough so as not to allow a
lOb-5 action every time "someone does something bad." 59
Although the Eason court advocated this intermediate approach, it
declined to formulate a rule embodying its principles. 60 The court pretion were then falsified to reflect merely an exchange of the Treasury bonds for the
certificate of deposit. Id. at 7-10.
In Birnbaum, the court stated that section 10(b) was "directed solely at that
type of misrepresentation or fraudulent practice usually associated with the sale or
purchase of securities." 193 F.2d at 464 (emphasis added). In later years, however,
novel, fraudulent schemes forced the Second Circuit to retreat from this position as
indicated in the following statement:
We believe that § 10(b) and rule 10b-5 prohibit all fraudulent schemes in
connection with the purchases or sale of securities, whether the artifices employed
involve a garden type variety of fraud, or present a unique form of deception.
A.T. Brod & Co. v. Perlow, 375 F.2d 393, 397 (2d Cir. 1967).
It should be noted, however, that the Second Circuit denied standing to the
plaintiffs in Bankers Life because they were not purchasers or sellers. Superintendent
of Life Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 430 F.2d 355, 359-60 (2d Cir. 1970), rev'd
on other grounds, 404 U.S. 6 (1971).
55. The Fifth Circuit, though affirming Birnbaum, recently remarked:
The definitions of purchase and sale have sagged under the weight of courts'
attempts to prevent ingenious minds from deflecting the statutory purposes of
section 10(b). . . . To prevent the Birnbaum doctrine from limiting too severely
the ability of rule lOb-5 to meet the broad purposes of the Act, "seller" has been
stretched beyond its common law sense.
Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co., 489 F.2d 579, 590 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 43
U.S.L.W. 3202 (U.S. Oct. 10, 1974) (No. 73-1671).
56. Landy v. FDIC, 486 F.2d 139, 157 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 960
(1974); Herpich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792, 804-06 (5th Cir. 1970). See Marsh,
What Lies Ahead Under Rule 10b-5?, 24 Bus. LAW. 69 (1968).
57. 1 BROMBERG, supra note 18, § 2.2, at 331.
58. Herpich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792, 804-06 (5th Cir. 1970). See id. at 800-01,
805-06. See also Landy v. FDIC, 486 F.2d 139, 157 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416
U.S. 960 (1974).
59. R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, SECURITIES REGULATIONS 961 (2d ed. 1968).
Published
by Villanova
University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1974
60. 490
F.2d at 660 n.29.
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ferred to allow future courts to determine on an ad hoc basis whether a
particular plaintiff has demonstrated membership in the "special class"
protected by rule lOb-5."1 In this way, the parameters of the replacement
for Birnbaum could gradually be developed so as to avoid the need for
62
engrafting exception upon exception to meet new factual situations.
Unlike the purchaser-seller rule, which is tied to and limited by the common law concepts of "purchase" and "sale," the "investor" classification
is flexible and susceptible to case-by-case development. The court thus
concluded that the plaintiffs qualified as members of the class intended
to be protected by the rule by virtue of their shareholder status and the
03
execution of their personal guarantees.
Having rejected the Birnbaum interpretation, the court discussed
two possible policy ramifications that had been advocated as justifications
for the retention of the doctrine. 6 4 The court responded to the contention that elimination of the purchaser-seller requirement would result in
an "unmanageable flood of federal litigation"65 by noting that such a
claim was merely speculative because plaintiffs would still be required to
show that they were "investors" - the class of persons protected by
rule 10b-5.66 Furthermore, the alleged danger was mitigated by the fact
that a causal connection between the defendant's fraud and the plaintiff's
injury had to be established. 67 As a final reason for rejecting the defendant's argument, the court cited the Supreme Court's silence on the issue
in a recent case which liberally construed the phrase "in connection with."s
With respect to the defendant's second contention, that the purchaserseller requirement was necessary "to preserve national consistency in the
interpretation of federal securities regulation," 69 the court reasoned that
due to the often strained expansion of the terms "purchaser" and "seller"
to effectuate the application of the rule to various fact situations, 70 the
unanimity of the circuit courts' adherence to Birnbaum was superficial ;71
any effort to preserve this "consistency" should not prevent an "inde72
pendent appraisal of an important issue" in a developing area of the law.

61. Id. at 660.
62. See note 40 supra.
63. 490 F.2d at 659-60.
64. Courts frequently justify their support for Birnbaum on policy considerations.
See, e.g., Herpich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792 (5th Cir. 1970), wherein the court
reasons that limitation of the class of persons who can sue under rule 10b-5 is necessary for the maintenance of a "viable, vigorous business community." Id. at 804.
65. 490 F.2d at 660, citing Manor Drug Stores v. Blue Chip Stamps, 492 F.2d
136, 147 (9th Cir. 1973) (Hufstedler, J., dissenting), cert. granted,95 S.Ct. 302 (1974).
66. 490 F.2d at 660.
67. Id. See note 22 supra.

68. 490 F.2d at 66, citing Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404

U.S. 6 (1971). See note 54 supra.
69. 490 F.2d at 660, citing Mount Clemens Indus., Inc. v. Bell, 464 F.2d 339, 342
(9th Cir. 1972).
70. 490 F.2d at 661 n.30, citing 2 BROMBERG, supra note 18, § 8.8, at 222.
71. 490 F.2d at 661.
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol19/iss6/5
72. Id.
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Moreover, the court believed that true consistency could be achieved only
73
by a Supreme Court pronouncement on the issue.
The Eason court's recognition that anticipation of an increased workload for federal courts should not compel an incorrect interpretation of
the statute and rule is meritorious. If a plaintiff fulfills a "standing requirement" and consequently is an appropriate party to maintain a cause of
action,7 4 and that party falls within the class of persons Congress intended
to protect, 75 a court should not arbitrarily refuse to hear his claim. No
court should sanction a rule which simply seeks to limit the number of
actions brought, while leaving an injured plaintiff without a remedy.
Further, under the Eason "ad hoc" test, the number of potential plaintiffs
may not, in fact, be greatly increased. The shareholders in Eason, while
not having bought or sold securities, had played a substantial role in the
transaction in question by their issuance of their personal guarantees.
The case may thus be interpreted to mean that in order to prove that one
is in fact an "investor" protected by the rule, a plaintiff will have to show
some action on his part in addition to the fact that he relied on defendant's
actions and that the value of his stock decreased, or that he chose to forego
an investment opportunity which subsequently proved profitable. (Indeed,
some of the circuits which adhere to Birnbaum76 have so liberally interpreted its requirements that arguably they would have classified the Eason
plaintiffs as "sellers" of securities or otherwise permitted them to maintain
their action. 77) Additionally, a potential plaintiff must allege the necessary
elements of a lOb-5 cause of action, including a causal connection between
defendant's fraud and plaintiff's injury. 78 This latter requirement has
often been urged 79 and at times accepted80 as a substitute for Birnbaum,
73. Id.

74. See note 28 and accompanying text supra.
75. See text accompanying notes 58-59 supra.
76. The courts of appeals are nearly unanimous in their adoption of Birnbaum
in one form or another. See, e.g., Iroquois Indus., Inc. v. Syracuse China Corp., 417
F.2d 963 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 909 (1970); Landy v. FDIC, 486
F.2d 139 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 960 (1974); Smallwood v. Pearl
Brewing Co., 489 F.2d 579 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 43 U.S.L.W. 3202 (U.S.
Oct. 10, 1974) (No. 73-1671); Simmons v. Wolfson, 428 F.2d 455 (6th Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 999 (1971); Travis v. Anthes Imp. Ltd., 473 F.2d 515 (8th
Cir. 1973) ; Manor Drug Stores v. Blue Chip Stamps, 492 F.2d 136 (9th Cir. 1973),
cert. granted, 95 S.Ct. 302 (1974) ; Jenson v. Voyles, 393 F.2d 131 (10th Cir. 1968).
77. Plaintiffs might have fallen within one of the well-recognized exceptions to
the Birnbaum rule. See note 39 supra. Some courts have held that in certain situations,
a non-purchasing or non-selling plaintiff might be allowed to sue. For example, in
Landy v. FDIC, 486 F.2d 139 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 960 (1974), the
Third Circuit, though affirming the Birnbaum rule, stated that "[e]xceptional circumstances may arise in which a stockholder might have a cause of action due to
fraud in connection with the stock he holds and has not sold; that situation is not
before us." Id. at 158. See also Travis v. Anthes Imp. Ltd., 473 F.2d 515, 521 n.9
(8th Cir. 1973).
78. There is no unaminity as to the precise elements of a 10b-5 cause of action.
However, it is generally agreed that they should include scienter, materiality, reliance,
and privity. For detailed discussion of each, see 2 BROMBERG, supra note 18, §§ 8.1-8.9.
79. The SEC has been the leading proponent of this view. See, e.g., Vine v.
Beneficial Fin. Co., 374 F.2d 627, 636 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 970 (1967).
80. In Tully v. Mott Supermarkets, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 834 (D.N.J. 1972), the
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though such a test goes to the merits and cannot be classified as a "stand's
ing requirement."'
The Eason court also seems correct in its response that the "national
consistency" argument presumes a unity which is, in fact, illusory. In
an area where complex transactions are commonplace and the opportunities for "novel or atypical"' 2 schemes seems endless, it is perhaps
inevitable that still more situations will arise where a non-purchasing or
non-selling plaintiff is in-fact injured by a defendant's fraud in connection
with a securities transaction. Many courts, feeling that the claim should
not be foreclosed, will allow the suit via a "broad and flexibl [e]" construction of the statutory language. 83 If in fact the courts are to continue to
create a "federal corporations law," 8 4 it is questionable whether the con-

tinued application of the purchaser-seller doctrine which will further
compel a continuing movement away from the common law concepts of purchase and sale, will encourage the development of the necessary "analytical
precision." 85 Viewed in this respect, the Seventh Circuit's decision to "start
anew" and eliminate the purchaser-seller requirement is commendable.
However, if the Eason approach does in fact result in overcrowded
federal dockets, nuisance suits,8 6 and unlimited liability,8

7

plus renewed

and usurpation of legislative function, 89
cries of excessive federalism
several alternatives are available. First, there could always be a retention
of or return to the status quo - a Birnbaum rule applied "broadly and
flexibly" to effectuate the purpose of the rule. The evils of this alternative
have already been discussed. Second, Congress could codify rule lOb-5
88

existence of a causal relationship between fraud in connection with the purchase or
sale of securities and plaintiffs' loss." Id. at 841 (citation omitted). The Tully
court was faced with a claim for retroactive rather than prospective injunctive relief.
Id. Therefore, the case does not fall within the exception created by Mutual Shares
Corp. v. Genesco, 384 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1967). See note 22 supra. Tully was not
appealed and the Third Circuit subsequently reaffirmed Birnbaum in Landy v. FDIC,
486 F.2d 139 (3d Cir. 1973.), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 960 (1974).
81. Presumably a challenge to the claim would arise on a motion for summary
judgment rather than on a motion to dismiss. Dismissal on the former grounds would
be res judicata while a dismissal for lack of standing would allow suit in a state court,
if a cause of action were available.
82. See A.T. Brod & Co. v. Perlow, 375 F.2d 393, 397 (2d Cir. 1967).
83. See, e.g., Herpich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792, 806 (5th Cir. 1970). See also
Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12 (1971).
84. See generally Bradford, Rule 10b-5: The Search for a Limiting Doctrine,
19 BUFFALO L. REV. 205 (1970); Fleischer, supra note 4.
85. See Kellog, supra note 20, at 117.
86. According to this argument, defendants, after already having incurred the
time and expense of preliminary discovery and motion practice, will, if a motion to
dismiss is unsuccessful, simply settle to avoid a complex, lengthy trial with its
attendant costs and risks. See Comment, supra note 20, at 1030.
87. Conversely, it has been argued that rather than defining a proscribed area
of conduct and thereby limiting liability under the rule, the Birnbaum requirement
instead defines who may be defrauded with impunity. Id. at 1032.
88. In response to the argument that an expanded rule lOb-5 would envelop state
law (see Comment, supra note 20, at 1034), one can point to the lack of protection
for shareholders and absence of effective remedies in many states. See Ruder, Current
Developments In The Federal Law Of Corporate Fiduciary Relations - Standing To
Sue Under Rule 10b-5, 26 Bus. LAW. 1289 (1971).
89. See, e.g., Landy v. FDIC, 486 F.2d 139, 156-57 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 12
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol19/iss6/5
416 U.S. 960 (1974).

